Research:

My current papers can be classified into two themes: Asymmetry in Auctions [and procurement], and The Economics of Fleets.

Asymmetry in Auctions [Procurement]

I consider models where the asymmetry is by construction, and those where the asymmetry is due to collusion among bidders. For the latter case, I address what I think are relax-able assumptions regarding what is known when bidders collude, and I compare outcomes from my modified framework to those from the literature. For the former case, given the difficulty with obtaining closed-form solutions in asymmetric first price auctions with continuous valuations, most of the analyses that can be conducted use indirect methods. My research with co-authors here focus on cases where the value/cost distribution is discrete. We are thus able to derive explicit mixed strategy equilibria which enable us extend insights obtained in the continuous case. The following are the papers on this theme:

• Investments in First-Price and Second-Price Procurement Auctions
  with Domenico Menicucci and Nicola Doni; Revise and Resubmit at International Journal of Industrial Organization.
  Abstract

  This paper is about a procurement auction setting with two sellers in which before the auction seller i can make an investment which improves the ex ante probability distribution of his cost; seller j observes seller j’s investment decision before bidding occurs. Under somewhat restrictive assumptions on the pre- and the post-investment cost distributions, Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) prove that in the first price auction seller i’s investment induces seller j to bid more aggressively. This negative strategic effect contributes to AC’s result that the investment incentive for seller i is stronger in the second price auction than in the first price auction. We prove that under weaker but economically significant assumptions, and discretely distributed costs, an investment by seller i may actually induce seller j to bid less aggressively in the first price auction (i.e., the strategic effect may be positive), and the investment incentive may be stronger in the latter auction. Moreover, in some cases the buyer prefers the first price auction precisely because it provides a stronger investment incentive, even though the second price auction is preferable when no investment is possible. We prove that the two auctions are not equivalent in a setting in which each seller has the option to invest and the sellers are ex ante symmetric, and that the second price auction gives a stronger investment incentive to the initially stronger seller than to the other seller (this increases asymmetries), but such result does not necessarily hold in the first price auction.

• Secret versus Public Rings in Common Value Auctions
  International Journal of Economic Theory, 22: 63-90, 2026.
  Abstract

  For a second-price common value auction with an “almost all-inclusive ring”, we analyze whether the auctioneer should reveal the ring’s presence, and if so, whether this revelation should be public or private to the nonring bidder. We show for a family of value functions that public revelation induces the nonring bidder to bid higher than in a non-cooperative scenario. This implies that the auctioneer may improve his position this way. On the other hand, it highlights a new tactic that an auctioneer may use to manipulate bidder behavior by creating the false impression of collusion to induce higher bids.

• Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations
  with Domenico Menicucci and Nicola Doni; B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 25(1): 99-118, 2025.
  Abstract

  We examine a two-bidder auction setting in which the distributions for the bidders’ valuations are asymmetric over a support consisting of three elements. For the first price auction, for each parameter values we derive the unique Bayes Nash Equilibrium in closed form. We rely on this result to compare the revenue in the first price auction with the revenue in the second price auction. The latter is often revenue superior to the former, and we determine precisely, given a distribution for the value of a bidder, when a distribution for the value of the other bidder exists such that the first price auction is superior to the second price auction.

• Collusion with Not-So-Secret Rings
  Journal of Quantitative Economics, 22(2): 563-570, 2024.
  Abstract

  When collusion is analyzed for Independent private value auctions, it is implicitly assumed that ring presence is commonly known to colluding and non-colluding bidders. We drop this assumption and analyze a simple model of a first price Independent Private Value auction with uniformly distributed values where a single bidder knows privately of the existence of collusion by others. We show that this knowledge leads him to bid shading (weakly) in the first price auction compared to what he would have bid otherwise. This in turn yields the result that the second price auction dominates the first price auction in terms of seller revenue. This contrasts results from the literature showing that under our framework, when bidding is done while the presence of colluding bidders is common knowledge, the first price auction dominates the second price auction.

The Economics of Fleets

The broad research interest here is in the economics of autonomous vehicles; particularly how it relates to congestion. Previous papers emphasized the idea that a transport system operated by a monopolist internalizes congestion as compared to when people travel independently.

• Congestion and the Market Structure of Fleets
  with Federico Boffa and Alberto Iozzi; Case Studies on Transport Policy, 2026.
  Abstract

  Fleets are becoming increasingly prevalent in urban transport. Unlike traditional vehicles, fleet operators may be able to internalize, at least partly, the congestion cost they impose on other fleet vehicles, thereby reducing the level of congestion. We analyze the optimal market structure in the market for fleets by comparing welfare under a monopolistic and a competitive fleet. Our model exhibits a unit mass of heterogeneous travelers choosing between private vehicles, vehicles belonging to a fleet, and public transport. We assume that private and fleet vehicles create congestion, while public transport does not. We emphasize a stark trade-off: a monopolistic fleet may be better at internalizing the congestion cost, but, as standard, may inefficiently reduce the amount of fleet vehicles dispatched. We find that, when the cost of a private car is high (such as in the case of dense urban contexts), and travelers choose between fleet vehicles and public transport only, a monopolistic fleet may be welfare superior to a competitive fleet, due to its superior ability to internalize congestion costs. In situations where the cost of using a private car is low or public transport options are absent, travelers face a choice between private cars and fleet vehicles only. Under these conditions, a competitive fleet structure is welfare-superior to a monopolistic one, as cost-reflective pricing, fostered by competition, exerts a greater influence on welfare than the internalization of congestion externalities.

  Working paper version

Work in Progress:

• Food Fraud for Horizontally Differentiated Products.
• Competing with Self-Providing Consumers.